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Multimember Legislative Bodies and
Intended Meaning

JEFFREY GOLDSWORTHY*

I. THE MEANING OF ORDINARY COMMUNICATIONS:
MARY AND THE SHIP “PEERLESS”
Intentionalists agree that the meaning of an ordinary communication is
either identical to or depends heavily on what the speaker or author
intended it to be. But the “or” marks a disagreement between “subjective”
intentionalists, such as Larry Alexander and Richard Kay, and “objective”
intentionalists such as me.1
Subjective intentionalists claim that the meaning of any communication is
whatever its speaker intended it to mean. Objective intentionalists find
this dubious because it seems possible for the meaning that people
intend to communicate to differ from the meaning they do communicate.
It surely cannot be the case that, whenever we speak or write with the
intention of expressing or implying something, we are guaranteed to
successfully express or imply that thing simply by virtue of having
that intention. People can intend to say or imply something but fail to do
so, and conversely, they can say or imply something they did not intend.
When we are told that we have misunderstood what someone meant, we
often defend ourselves by replying: “I now realize what she meant to say,
*
© 2021 Jeffrey Goldsworthy. Emeritus Professor of Law, Monash University;
Professorial Fellow, The University of Melbourne; Adjunct Professor of Law, The University
of Adelaide.
1. For an extended exploration of this disagreement, see JEFFREY GOLDSWORTHY,
Subjective versus Objective Intentionalism in Legal Interpretation, in MORAL PUZZLES
AND LEGAL PERPLEXITIES; ESSAYS ON THE INFLUENCE OF LARRY ALEXANDER 170–88
(Heidi M. Hurd, ed., 2019).
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but that’s not what she did say,” or “He may not have intended to imply
that, but he did.”2 Subjective intentionalists must deny that such replies
can be strictly correct: if the meaning of someone’s utterance is identical
to the meaning she intends it to have, then she can only appear to, but
cannot really, say something other than what she intends to say. That
strikes me as counterintuitive.
When people fail to communicate the meaning they intend to
communicate, the meaning they do communicate must be something else.
In such cases, the meaning of their utterance—their speech act—is surely the
meaning they inadvertently communicate, not the one they intended to
communicate. If A’s utterance fails to communicate the meaning A
intended to communicate to his intended audience (through A’s fault, not
theirs), but communicates some other meaning to them instead, that
other meaning—and not A’s meaning—must be the meaning of A’s utterance.
That meaning is what A’s meaning appears to his intended audience to be,
given evidence that is readily available to them, including the conventional
meanings of A’s words and other clues as to his intentions such as
shared background knowledge of his beliefs and values, and the context in
which the utterance was made.3 Objective intentionalism, therefore, holds
that what people appear to say or imply, in the light of all the evidence
readily available to their intended audience, is what they do say or imply.
Mary must attempt to interpret a memorandum signed by both of her
two employers that refers to the ship “Peerless” sailing to Athens.
Unknown to them, there are two ships with that name and destination, and
they had different ships in mind. Mary cannot contact either of them for
clarification. We are asked what Mary has been instructed to do (not what
she should do).
I assume that Mary discovers that there are two ships. If the only
available evidence of her employers’ communicative intentions is the
memorandum, then the meaning of her instruction is irredeemably ambiguous.
That is all that can be said in answering the question—the issue is then
what she should do about it, which we have been asked not to consider.
If other background or contextual evidence is available to Mary
suggesting (erroneously) that her employers had in mind one of the two
ships rather than the other, then depending on the strength of that evidence
she might be entitled to conclude that she has been instructed to deal with
that ship. Such further information might consist, for example, of one of
the employers having previously referred to that ship, or some past dealing
by the firm with it. This is, of course, a matter of probability rather than
2. Jeffrey Goldsworthy, Moderate versus Strong Intentionalism: Knapp and Michaels
Revisited, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 669, 677 (2005).
3. Id. at 670–71.
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certainty, but we often understand a communication to be intended to
mean what seems more likely than some alternative.
If other contextual evidence suggests to Mary that her employers had in
mind different ships—perhaps she finds other communications in which
they refer to different ships—then she would be aware that the problem is
not one of ambiguity but of partial incoherence. If the intended recipient
of a communication has good reason to conclude that its authors had
inconsistent communicative intentions, then to that extent the communication
has no coherent meaning. Mary knows that instructions are not “operative”
if they have not been agreed to by both partners, and in this instance, no
coherent instruction has been agreed to. She might therefore be justified
in doing nothing (although we have been asked not to discuss that issue).
II. THE MEANING OF STATUTES: THE TAX ON IMPORTED FRUIT
The disagreement between subjective and objective intentionalists
carries over to the meanings of statutes and other legal texts. The way in
which these texts should, as a matter of law, be interpreted is ultimately
determined by legal norms established by the conventional practices of
legal officials, especially judges. 4 It cannot be determined merely by
philosophical truths about linguistic meaning in general, although they
can be made relevant by practice-based norms.
As for the interpretation of statutes, for at least six centuries common
law courts have maintained that the primary object of statutory interpretation
“is to determine what intention is conveyed, either expressly or by
implication, by the language used,”5 or in other words, “to give effect to
the intention of the [lawmaker] as that intention is to be gathered from the
language employed having regard to the context in connection with which
it is employed.”6 Interpretive principles have also regulated the kinds of
evidence of such intentions that is admissible in court. The admissibility
of “legislative history” has been of particular concern and has varied over
time and across common law jurisdictions.
Sometimes the meaning that the lawmaker intended to communicate
remains obscure, or even incoherent, even after the judge has exhausted
all admissible evidence of it. The common law of statutory interpretation
4. Jeffrey Goldsworthy, Originalism in Constitutional Interpretation, 25 FED. L.
REV. 1, 8 (1997).
5. SIR PETER BENSON MAXWELL, ON THE INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES 1 (1883).
6. Attorney-General v Carlton Bank [1899] 2 QB 158 at 164 (Eng.).
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provides an array of further principles (or presumptions or canons) of
interpretation that help to determine the meanings of statutes in these and
other situations. The “legal meaning” of a statute could be said to be the
result of applying all relevant interpretive principles.
There is theoretical debate about the nature of many of these principles,
and the consequences of applying them. Some assist in ascertaining the
legislature’s communicative intentions. Others appear to require a higher
than ordinary standard of proof of certain kinds of legislative intentions,
such as intentions to encroach upon traditional common law doctrines or
legal rights. Yet others arguably function as tie-breakers, resolving
otherwise unresolvable indeterminacies in communicative content in
favor of long-standing common law rights and other principles. 7 These
principles help to supplement the meanings of statutes that would otherwise
be under-determinate.
Some common law interpretive principles, in exceptional circumstances,
permit or require correcting or rectifying statutory meaning. These
circumstances are confined to ones in which judges must act creatively in
order to serve as the legislature’s “faithful agents,” for example, by
correcting a scrivener’s error, “reading down” a provision to ensure that
it is constitutionally valid, and fabricating a so-called “implication” to
ensure that a statute achieves the legislature’s obvious and immediate
purposes in enacting it, or does not inadvertently violate the legislature’s
presumed standing commitments to important legal principles (such as
that of mens rea).
None of this alters the central intentionalist thesis that statutory
interpretation is concerned first and foremost with inferring the communicative
intentions of the legislature from all admissible evidence.
In the case of the statute taxing imported fruit, we are not told whether
similar interpretive principles have been established in Lex. If they have
been, the judge must apply them; if not, he will have discretion to decide
what principles of interpretation he ought to apply. If I were the judge I
would apply objective intentionalism.
The lawmakers who enacted the statute had inconsistent intentions
about what they were communicating by enacting it, although the
inconsistency is partial and limited. We are told that the judge knows this:
he or she has “learned all the facts related above.” I assume that this
includes the facts set out in footnote 2, concerning the deceptive and
corrupt conduct of the legislative aide, although that does not seem crucial
to answering the main question.

7. Non-intentionalists, of course, argue that these principles protect such rights
and principles regardless of legislative intentions.
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A preliminary issue is whether or not the judge has acquired this
knowledge in accordance with whatever legal principles in Lex—if any—
govern the admissibility of evidence of legislative intention. If he has,
this knowledge can influence his effort to ascertain the statute’s legal
meaning, but otherwise, it cannot. If there are no such principles, the
judge is legally free to take this knowledge into account, although as an
objective intentionalist I would refuse to do so if the facts were not
reasonably accessible to lawyers (on whom the public rely for legal
advice) in general. This is because objective intentionalists deny that the
meaning of any utterance—and especially of an important public document
such as a statute—depends on private, esoteric information. Evidence of
legislative intention must be reasonably available to its intended audience.
I will assume either that the knowledge was acquired through admissible
evidence, or that it was reasonably accessible to lawyers in general.
The main question is what the judge should decide, although this seems
to mean “decide whether the tax applies to” tomatoes and kiwis. On this
interpretation, the question is similar to that asked in the case of Mary:
what does the communication (here, the statute) mean, rather than what
should the audience (the judge) do in the face of irresolvable incoherence?
The judge knows that the lawmakers had inconsistent communicative
intentions about whether the word “fruit” has its culinary meaning or its
botanical meaning. The proportion of votes within the legislature—also
known to him—is such that he cannot attribute either meaning to the
legislature as such. He should conclude that the legislature intended to
tax everything that is a fruit according to both the culinary and botanical
meanings of “fruit,” but had no coherent intention regarding any product
that is a fruit according to one meaning but a vegetable according to the
other.
“Kiwis” —often known as “kiwifruit” (but originally a Chinese gooseberry)
—are fruit according to both the culinary and botanical meaning. The
statute clearly applies to them regardless of the lawmakers’ partially
conflicting communicative intentions.
The judge should conclude that the statute has no coherent meaning that
determines its application to tomatoes, which are fruit according to the
botanical meaning, but not according to the culinary one. In that and any
similar case, in which a product falls within the area of statutory incoherence,
the next question for the judge is whether other established interpretive
principles can help to resolve the problem. In the United States, given the
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precedent in Nix v Hedden,8 about which a competent and conscientious
American legislature should be deemed to have been informed, there
would be a strong case for deciding in favour of the culinary meaning.
But if the jurisdiction of Lex has no such precedent, the judge must find
some other way to deal with the incoherence. There might, for example,
be a tie-breaking principle requiring the resolution of an otherwise
irresolvable incoherence in a tax law in favour of the taxpayer. The clause
forbidding any “discrimination among types of fruit” is useless, because
it is vitiated by the same incoherence. In the absence of any helpful
interpretive principle, the judge would have to exercise a law-making
discretion. To hold the entire statute to be void for incoherence would be
too extreme, given that the incoherence should affect only a tiny number
of products.
The fact that the lawmakers might not have enacted the statute at all, if
they had not been deceived by the corrupt legislative aide, is irrelevant.
The lawmakers have enacted the statute, which is therefore valid law.
Judges have no constitutional authority to invalidate a statute on the
ground that it was enacted only because some number (even a majority)
of the lawmakers were deceived. It is the lawmakers’ responsibility to ensure
that they are not deceived before enacting a statute.

8.
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149 U.S. 304 (1893).

